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ABSTRACT
Sequential group decision-making processes, such as online event
scheduling, can be subject to social influence if the decisions in-
volve individuals’ subjective preferences and values. Indeed, prior
work has shown that scheduling polls that allow respondents to see
others’ answers are more likely to succeed than polls that hide other
responses, suggesting the impact of social influence and coordina-
tion. In this paper, we investigate whether this difference is due
to information cascade effects in which later respondents adopt the
decisions of earlier respondents. Analyzing more than 1.3 million
Doodle polls, we found evidence that cascading effects take place
during event scheduling, and in particular, that early respondents
have a larger influence on the outcome of a poll than people who
come late. Drawing on simulations of an event scheduling model,
we compare possible interventions to mitigate this bias and show
that we can optimize the success of polls by hiding the responses
of a small percentage of low availability respondents.
Keywords
Decision-making; Doodle; Information cascade; Herding behavior;
Social influence
1. INTRODUCTION
Groups are often preferred as decision makers over individuals
because, collectively, they have access to more information [28, 30,
32]. However, group decision-making processes can be subject to
social influence, which can undermine their ability to make unbi-
ased decisions [26]. Social influence occurs when group members
simply conform to or adopt the behavior of other members [25].
Thus, a final decision might not be the result of its members’ un-
biased inputs, but instead the result of a biased decision-making
process derived from information cascades [3, 4, 5, 24], which can
distort the outcome.
Online event scheduling is a type of group decision-making pro-
cess, which supports groups in finding a mutually agreeable time.
While event scheduling could be expected to be less prone to social
influence when compared to other opinion-based processes such as
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full cita-
tion on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than
ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or re-
publish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission
and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
WSDM 2017, February 06-10, 2017, Cambridge, United Kingdom
© 2017 ACM. ISBN 978-1-4503-4675-7/17/02. . . $15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3018661.3018725
voting, decisions in event scheduling are not completely binary [23].
Prior research suggests that respondents of event scheduling polls
influence each other’s responses. Open polls, in which respondents
can see others’ availability, result in a higher number of mutually
agreeable times than hidden polls, in which others’ responses are
obscured [27] — a finding that suggests the presence of social in-
fluence. Depending on whether and how early respondents influ-
ence later respondents, this effect could have a negative or positive
impact on the likelihood that the group finds a time that accommo-
dates a large number of the group members.
To analyze the effect of social influence in event scheduling via
polls, this work investigates three questions: (1) Do early respon-
dents have a larger impact on the overall success of a poll compared
to late respondents? If so, this would suggest that social influence
in event scheduling generates cascading effects that form early on
in the polling process. (2) Do preceding members influence the
listed availability of proceeding group members and does the effect
diminish as users are further apart in order of arrival to the poll?
Understanding this would help further explain the mechanics of lo-
cal social influence that could result in global cascading effects. (3)
What interventions can be used by designers of event scheduling
services like Doodle to mitigate the negative impact of social influ-
ence and exploit its positive impact?
To answer these questions, we examined data from more than
1.3 million polls generated by users of the online event-scheduling
site Doodle.1 Our findings show that early respondents indeed have
a larger influence on the outcome of a poll than people who came
later. This finding does not hold for hidden polls, showing that the
effect is due to social influence. We also find that respondents are
influenced the most by others who posted just before them. This
indicates that preceding respondents have a larger influence on di-
rectly following respondents. Finally, based on the previous results,
we explore an intervention in the context of a simulation based on
an event scheduling model. The intervention aims to minimize the
negative effects of social influence and increase the success of event
scheduling polls. We find that we can eliminate the negative ef-
fects of social influence by hiding low availability responses from
less than 5% of the respondents, and we can optimize poll success
through the positive effects of social influence by hiding 35% to
65% of low availability responses.
The results of our analysis contribute to the literature by 1) ex-
amining how social influence materializes in event scheduling, 2)
identifying its negative impact on the success of event scheduling
polls, and 3) presenting an intervention that minimizes this nega-
tive impact on the success of event scheduling polls. In doing so,
our results inform the design of future event scheduling systems by
1http://www.doodle.com
Figure 1: An example poll on the online event scheduling site
Doodle.
showing how to limit the negative effects of social influence and
exploit its positive effects for more successful event scheduling.
2. RELATED WORK
Social influence occurs when an individual’s views, emotions, or
actions are impacted by the views, emotions or actions of another
individual [15]. Social influence has been observed in many do-
mains including health behaviors [13], political participation [9],
purchasing habits [19], collective decision-making (e.g. Wikipedia
promotions) [22], idea generation [1, 2, 34], and online news vot-
ing [25, 36]. In particular, the first few people who voice their
opinion or vote can determine the overall outcome [22, 25]. In
other words, early respondents tend to influence the members who
arrive later. This makes early arriving members the most influential
in a sequential group-decision making process.
Group think, peer pressure, or the need to conform to others are
all examples of social influence [18]. At the core of social influence
is the underlying problem that groups fail to reach a decision based
on the unique and independent information of its members [37]. In-
stead, groups reach decisions by having many members attempt to
match their preferences to the already stated views of a few mem-
bers [14].
Information cascades are particular instances of social influence
[17]. They occur when individuals not only follow the actions of
others, but do so despite holding private information that may con-
tradict the actions taken by others [16, 21]. Information cascades
have been observed in empirical and experimental settings [3, 4,
24] and a wide range of mathematical models and empirical studies
have been developed and conducted to understand cascade dynam-
ics [6, 7, 35, 11, 12, 38]. The existing models are very general and
apply to any setting where information cascades may occur. We
contribute to this work by extending previous cascade models such
that they apply specifically to event scheduling.
Another related phenomenon that results from social influence is
herd behavior [5]. Herd behavior occurs when individuals choose
to behave in the same way as others in a crowd, but unlike infor-
mation cascades they do not hold private information which con-
tradicts the actions of others [33]. While information cascades and
herd behavior are similar and often hard to tell apart, it is possible
to distinguish between the two through experiments [10].
In the case of scheduling, there is some evidence that social in-
fluence impacts the way that users respond to polls. The evidence
comes from the differences between open polls, where respondents
can see each other’s listed availabilities, and hidden polls, where
respondents cannot see each other’s listed availabilities. One study
found that respondents list a wider availability in open polls than
in hidden polls [39]. Open polls are also more successful when it
comes to reaching consensus [27]. This suggests that respondents
in open polls adjust their availability to align with those of their
colleagues; hence, increasing the opportunity to reach consensus.
It has also been observed that responses of later respondents are
correlated with earlier responses and this correlation is higher in
open polls [39]. This suggests that seeing prior responses affects
the way respondents answer the poll.
This paper aims to build on prior work that has identified social
influence in event scheduling by analyzing and quantifying the im-
pact that social influence has on scheduling polls. We have the par-
ticular goals of investigating the extent to which poll participants
adopt the decisions of earlier respondents, how long the effect of
a response lasts on future respondents, whether early respondents
have a disproportionate impact on the success of a poll, and to pro-
vide possible strategies that may allow us to mitigate any negative
impact of social influence.
3. DOODLE DATASET
Doodle is a scheduling service that allows groups of people to
find a mutually agreeable time. An initiator creates a Doodle poll
that is sent to group members. The poll asks each group member
to declare whether they are available for each of the time slot op-
tions originally chosen by the poll initiator (see Figure 1). After
all members have responded to the poll, the initiator can determine
which slot is the most appropriate to schedule the event. This is
usually the slot that accommodates the most group members.
Doodle offers both open and hidden polls. In open polls, re-
spondents are able to see the responses of other group members
and the order in which they arrived before responding to the poll.
In this case, respondents have an opportunity to get a clear view
of the availability of all respondents who came before them. In
hidden polls, respondents cannot see others’ responses – they list
their availability without knowing the availability of others. Doodle
also supports “if need be" polls, in which individuals can addition-
ally choose a third option to indicate that they could be available if
nothing else works. Most polls do not have the “if need be" option,
therefore we do not include them in our study.
Our data2 contains 1,303,941 anonymized open and 26,613 hid-
den yes/no polls. The users who generated these polls are in 190
different countries. Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of the number of responses and options of open and hid-
den polls. We observe that the number of respondents and options
in the polls range from 2 to over 100. Also, open polls tend to have
a smaller number of respondents and options than hidden polls.
4. INFORMATION CASCADE EFFECTS IN
DOODLE POLLS
4.1 Poll success
We begin by defining and measuring the success of a Doodle
poll. People use Doodle polls for different purposes. Sometimes
they are trying to find a time slot that is available to all respondents
and other times they are trying to find a slot that will accommodate
the most people, even if there is not a time slot that works for all
participants. Because we are not able to identify the goals that the
participants of the poll had in mind, we use an intuitive measure
of success: the percentage of participants who are available on the
most popular time slot. This measure is exactly what participants
are trying to maximize when they are looking for a time slot that
works for most people. This also measures how close the partici-
pants are to finding a time that works for everyone. In either case,
it is reasonable to assume that a poll where a high percentage of
2This dataset was obtained in collaboration with Doodle.
(a) CDF of the number of respondents in open and hidden
polls.
(b) CDF of number of options in open and hidden polls.
Figure 2: The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number of respondents and options of open and hidden polls.
(a) Success of polls by number of options. (b) Success of polls by number of respondents.
Figure 3: Success of polls based on the number of respondents and options.
the participants are accommodated in some time slot is more suc-
cessful than one where only a small percentage of participants are
available in all time slots.
Note that our measure of success applies to the global success of
the poll, not necessarily to the individual goals of the respondents.
There are many considerations that respondents have in mind when
they answer the poll, making their individual goals complex. For
example, respondents may consider their own preferences, their re-
lationship with other respondents, their perception of the impor-
tance of the event, and how the other respondents may perceive
them based on their availability. Indeed, it has been observed that
open polls on Doodle have higher response rates for highly popular
and highly unpopular slots [39], which suggests that respondents
attempt to coordinate with others and also attempt to appear flexible
with their time by making themselves as available during slots that
are unlikely to be chosen for the event. This highlights the com-
plexity of individual goals, which we do not attempt to measure or
model. Instead, we focus on the global success of a poll.
We formally define poll success as the following. Each poll has a
number of people who respond to the poll sequentially and a num-
ber of options that respondents label as available or unavailable.
For each poll p we define Rp and Op as the number of respondents
and options, respectively. We let Ap(i, j) be an indicator function
that indicates whether the ith respondent is available for option j:
Ap(i, j) =
1 ith respondent is available for option j0 otherwise
The success of poll p is succp = max
j∈[1,Op]
1
Rp
Rp∑
i=1
Ap(i, j). For each
poll p, succp is the percentage of respondents who are available for
the option that accommodated the most respondents.
Throughout the paper we will measure how different character-
istics of a poll affect its success. In this section we explore two
basic properties that have a very clear effect on the poll’s success –
the number of options and the number of respondents. We will also
compare how our measure differs when we consider open polls and
hidden polls. We use the set of hidden polls as a control group of
polls. While there could be systematic differences in the reasons
that people choose to create open and hidden polls, the only way in
which they differ on how they work on Doodle is that the responses
on hidden polls are not public. Comparing effects in open and hid-
den polls allows us to identify effects that are due to respondents
being able to observe each other’s responses.
Figure 3 shows how the success of the polls changes with the
number of respondents and options. Polls with a larger number of
respondents tend to be less successful in both open and hidden polls
than those with small number of respondents, which shows that it
is generally harder to accommodate a larger group. The number of
options has a positive effect on the success of open polls, suggest-
ing that when more time slots are available, more people can be
accommodated. However, for hidden polls, the number of options
has a slightly negative effect on success as the number of options
increases from 1 to 5. Beyond 5, there is no relationship between
number of options and success. This contrast between the effect of
number of options in open and hidden polls suggests that in order
to take advantage of a larger number of slots, respondents need to
be able to coordinate, and hence need to see each other’s responses.
4.2 Impact of Early Respondents
One of our goals is to explore the role of early respondents on the
overall success of the poll, and in particular the effect of early re-
spondents with low availability. If respondents are simply reporting
their availability, independently of the availability of other respon-
dents, then we should observe no effect. However, if respondents
are able to observe others’ responses and take these observations
into account when reporting their own availability, then having an
early respondent with low availability could have a negative effect
on the overall poll. When a new respondent observes that earlier
respondents reported low availability, this removes social pressure
from the new respondent to report a wide availability. This effect
could cascade through the sequence of respondents, making each
new respondent more likely to report a limited availability.
We measure the extent to which early respondents of poll p re-
ported low or high availability in three ways. First, we identify
when the respondent with the lowest availability came in the se-
quence of respondents – we let loc_min = argmin
i∈[1,Rp]
1
Op
Op∑
j=1
Ap(i, j)
be the location of the respondent with the lowest availability. Sec-
ond, we identify when the respondent with the highest availability
arrived – we let loc_max = argmax
i∈[1,Rp]
1
Op
Op∑
j=1
Ap(i, j) be the loca-
tion of the respondent with the highest availability. These first two
measures capture the location of the extreme respondents. Third,
we also measure the general trend of how the availability of the re-
spondents changes as the respondents arrive to the poll. To do this,
we let aip =
1
Op
Op∑
j=1
Ap(i, j) be the fraction of options the ith respon-
dent reported as available. Then we compute the Spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient between the sequences {aip}Rpi=1 and {i}Rpi=1. We
let trendp be this correlation. Thus, trendp measures the extent
to which the sequence of availability of the respondents tends to
increase or decrease as they arrive to the poll. When trendp is posi-
tive (negative), the availability of the respondents tends to increase
(decrease) as they arrive.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the success of a poll
(succp) and each one of the following variables in open polls: lo-
cation of the respondent with lowest availability (locminp ), location
of the respondent with highest availability (locmaxp ), and the trend
in availability (trendp). Since we know that the number of respon-
dents have a high impact on succp, Figure 4 shows results sepa-
rately for polls with 2-7 respondents. This accounts for about 80%
of all polls. We observe that succp generally increases with locminp
and decreases with locmaxp and trendp. The results consistently indi-
cate that when early respondents report low availability, the overall
success of the poll decreases.
In order to further investigate the relationship between locminp ,
locmaxp , and trendp and the success of the polls, independently of
the number of respondents and options of the poll, we run OLS
regressions of the form succp = β1Rp+β2Op+β3locminp +β4loc
max
p +
β5trendp + p. Table 1 shows the coefficients and p-values of each
variable in open polls. We find that there is a significant relationship
(p < 0.01) between all the independent variables and the success of
open polls. Furthermore, the sign of the coefficients is consistent
with the observations in Figure 4.
Our result suggests that early respondents influence the rest of
the respondents. This assumes that when a respondent comes to
the poll, she is aware of the responses of previous respondents. We
also produce the plots in Figure 4 using hidden polls, in which re-
spondents are unable to see other responses. Figure 5 shows the
relationship between succp and locminp , loc
max
p , and trendp in hidden
polls. The only effect we observe in hidden polls happens when
locminp and loc
max
p change from 1 to 2 and succp increases slightly in
both cases. Furthermore, we run the same OLS regressions using
hidden polls. Table 2 shows the coefficients and p-values. We find
that only the variables Rp and trendp remain significant (p < 0.01),
suggesting that most of the effects observed in open polls disappear
in hidden polls. This indicates that the effects we observed in Fig-
ure 4 and Table 1 depend on the ability of the respondents to see
others’ responses. This aligns with our hypothesis that respondents
are influenced by the level of availability of previous respondents.
4.3 Impact of Nearby Respondents
In the previous section we found that the availability of early
respondents and the increasing or decreasing trend in availability as
respondents arrive to the poll have an impact on the overall success
of the poll. One way to explain this effect is that as respondents
arrive and observe a limited availability of previous respondents,
they may feel less pressure to report a wide availability. But how
long does the availability of a respondent continue to have an effect
on future respondents? That is, how much does the availability of
respondent i relate to the availability of respondent i+k? To answer
this question we compare the availability reported by users who are
near each other in the list of respondents.
Recall that aip =
1
Op
Op∑
j=1
Ap(i, j) indicates the fraction of options
for which the ith respondent is available in poll p. For each poll
p, we compute the mean availability of the respondents as mp =
mean(aip). We then define an indicator function, b
i
p, which indicates
whether the ith respondent has above or below average availability,
as:
bp(i, j) =
1 aip ≥ mp0 otherwise
We compute the probability that two users who are k spots away
from each other (that is, one user is the ith respondent and the other
users if the (i+k)th respondent) are both above or below average, or
whether one is above average and the other is below average. We
compute this probability separately for polls with 3, . . . , 7 respon-
dents. More specifically, we let cp(i, j) = 1 if aip = a
j
p and cp(i, j) =
0 if aip , a
j
p, and define Pkr =
1
(r − k)|S r |
∑
p∈S r
r−k∑
i=1
cp(i, i + k), where
S r is the set of polls with exactly r respondents. Pkr corresponds
Independent Variable Coefficient p-value
Num. Respondents (Rp) −0.0112 0.000
Num. Options (Op) 0.0002 0.000
Loc. least available respondent (locminp ) 0.0091 0.000
Loc. most available respondent (locmaxp ) −0.0039 0.000
Increasing availability trend (trendp) −0.0156 0.000
Table 1: OLS regressions for open polls succp = β1Rp + β2Op + β3locminp + β4locmaxp + β5trendp + p
Independent Variable Coefficient p-value
Num. Respondents (Rp) −0.0017 0.00
Num. Options (Op) 0.0000 0.769
Loc. least available respondent (locminp ) 0.0001 0.597
Loc. most available respondent (locmaxp ) −0.0008 0.018
Increasing availability trend (trendp) −0.0260 0.000
Table 2: OLS regressions for hidden polls succp = β1Rp + β2Op + β3locminp + β4locmaxp + β5trendp + p
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Poll success vs. (a) loc_min, (b) loc_max(b), and (c) trend plotted separately for open polls with 1-7 respondents.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5: Poll success vs. (a) loc_min, (b) loc_max(b), and (c) trend plotted separately for hidden polls with 1-7 respondents.
to the probability that users in polls with r respondents match in
having above or below average availability when they are k users
from each other in the list of respondents. Figures 6(a) and 6(b)
show curves Pkr vs k for r = 3, . . . , 7 in open and hidden polls,
respectively. We observe that Pkr decreases with k in open polls,
suggesting that users tend to match the availability of nearby users
and the matching decreases as the gap between the users increases.
In hidden polls, however, we observe that there is little or no rela-
tionship between Pkr and k, showing that when users are not aware
of each others responses, they do not match their availability.
The result suggests that the effect of early respondents on the
success of the polls is possibly due to a mechanism where respon-
dents influence other nearby respondents. When an early respon-
dent reports low availability, this has a cascading effect over the
rest of the poll and results in individuals reporting a low availabil-
ity, making the poll less successful.
Zou et al. found that the availability of polls in Doodle tends to
decrease as more respondents complete the poll [39], which could
affect some of our measures. However, they found that the decreas-
ing rate in availability is the same in open and hidden polls. Since
our analysis is largely based on the differences in the dynamics be-
tween open and hidden polls, we conclude that the decreasing trend
observed in [39] does not explain our findings.
(a) Open polls (b) Hidden polls
Figure 6: Probability of availability matching (Pkr ) vs. the lag between users (k) in open and hidden polls.
5. MODELING INFORMATION CASCAD-
ING BEHAVIOR IN EVENT SCHEDUL-
ING
In order to understand our empirical results further, we now de-
velop a model of scheduling that explicitly takes into account the
observation that early respondents tend to influence the responses
of subsequent respondents. Our goal with this model is to simulate
and compare potential interventions that a scheduling service such
as Doodle can implement in order to alleviate some of the negative
impact of this cascading behavior.
5.1 Model description
In the model, each poll has a fixed number of respondents r and
a number of time slots s. We also fix a parameter k that denotes
how many subsequent respondents each respondent will influence
and a parameter α ∈ [0, 1] that denotes how much early respondents
influence future respondents. Respondents arrive sequentially and
declare whether they are available or unavailable for each of the
slots. When deciding whether to report an option s as available or
not, respondent i considers two things. First, i considers her pri-
vate preference pre f is ∈ [0, 1] for slot s. Here, we assume that
rather than having binary preferences for time slots such as "busy"
or "free", respondents have a continuous preference for each time
slot that ranges from 0 (lowest preference) to 1 (highest prefer-
ence).
Additionally, i considers the average fraction of slots that the
previous k respondents marked as available, previk. As we ob-
served in our empirical findings, our model assumes that respon-
dents tend to correlate their availability with that of earlier respon-
dents. Thus, respondent i reports s as available with probability
pis,k = αprev
i
k + (1−α)pre f is . That is, respondent i puts a weight of
α on the availability of previous respondents and a weight of 1 − α
to her own preference. The process continues until all respondents
have declared their availability. Note that the parameter α controls
how much respondents weight their own preferences compared to
the availability of earlier respondents. When α is large, respondents
weight the availability of earlier respondents higher than their own
preferences, and vice versa when α is small. In other words, the
parameters α and k control social influence.
We begin by asking whether social influence, which is repre-
sented by parameters α and k, has a positive or negative effect on
the success of the polls. We run 50,000 simulations of the model
with 10 respondents, 10 options3, and various values of α and k. In
the simulations each respondent i chooses her preference for slot
s, pre f is , uniformly at random. We measure the success of the poll
for each run as defined in the previous section. Intuitively, the ef-
fect of social influence should depend on the whether the initial set
of respondents had high or low availability. However, we observe
that overall, the success of the polls decreases with α and k. Fig-
ure 7(a) shows the relationship between success, α and k. In our
model, social influence tends to have a slightly negative net impact
on the success in scheduling. Given this finding, we now explore
two potential interventions to mitigate the negative impact of social
influence on scheduling.
5.2 Interventions
Since in our model social influence negatively impacts the suc-
cess of polls, a natural strategy is to hide the responses of some
users in order to prevent them from influencing the responses of
others. In practice, hidden polls in Doodle have this feature but
also prevent users from coordinating. For example, in open polls,
respondents can shift their schedules in order to be available for a
slot that appears to be popular among other respondents. This type
of coordination can increase the success of a poll [27]. Hence, our
goal is to explore interventions that hide some of the responses, but
not necessarily all.
5.2.1 Hiding early respondents
We begin by extending the scheduling model to include a pa-
rameter I, such that the responses from the first I users are hidden
from all respondents. This would prevent cascades of low avail-
ability responses from forming early on in the poll. Note that this
is effectively a hybrid between Doodle’s open and hidden polls;
since only a portion of the respondents are hidden, coordination
among respondents who are not hidden is still possible. In the new
version of the model, the responses of the initial I are not taking
into account by the respondents when reporting their availability.
This implies that the first I poll participants only take into account
their own preferences and are not influenced by others. Also note
that when I is the same as the number of respondents, the model
is equivalent to a hidden Doodle poll, which also corresponds to
α = 0.
3All analyses presented in this section are based on 50,000 simu-
lations with 10 respondents and 10 options. Simulations were also
performed with different numbers of respondents and options (5 to
30) with the same results.
(a) Poll success vs. social influence parameters α and k.
The net impact of social influence on poll success is neg-
ative.
(b) Poll success vs. number of initial hidden responses
(I) for different values of α. Hiding initial users increases
the success of the polls up to the baseline success when
α = 0 (no social influence).
(c) Poll success vs. threshold used when hiding responses
with low availability (τ) for different values of α. Poll
success initially increases with τ, but decreases as τ be-
comes large.
(d) Percentage of respondents hidden when hiding re-
sponses with low availability (τ) for different values of
α.
Figure 7: Results from simulations of event scheduling model and interventions
We simulate this version of the model with 10 respondents, 10
options, k = 1, and various values of α and I. Figure 7(b) shows
the success of the simulated polls using different values of α and
I. We observe that for all values of α > 0, the success of the polls
increases with I until it reaches the same success as when α = 0.
Hence, hiding an initial set of respondents increases the success of
the polls, but it never improves success above the baseline of α = 0,
which is equivalent to hiding all responses.
5.2.2 Hiding low availability respondents
Rather than hiding all the responses of all initial respondents, we
now explore the effect of hiding responses of users with low avail-
ability. We extend our model by introducing a parameter τ ∈ [0, 1].
When a respondent computes the average fraction of slots that the
previous k respondents marked as available, previk, she will only
take into account respondents who have at least a τ fraction of slots
available. This effectively models an system where respondents
with availability less than τ are hidden from other respondents.
We simulate the new model with 10 respondents, 10 options,
k = 1, and various values of α and τ. Figure 7(c) shows that poll
success initially increases as τ increases, which is the effect of hid-
ing respondents with very low availability. However, as τ continues
to increase, the success of the polls eventually begins decreasing.
This is because when τ is too large, we are hiding respondents even
when they have high availability, which would otherwise influence
other respondents to increase their availability. Overall, we find that
hiding respondents with low availability is an effective strategy as
long as the threshold for hiding them is not too high.
Comparing the two strategies, we observe that hiding only those
users with very low availability can be much more effective than
hiding an initial set of respondents. For instance, even for very
small values of τ such as τ = 0.15, the success of the polls exceeds
the baseline of α = 0. Figure 7(d) shows the number of hidden
responses vs. τ. When τ = 0.15, less than 5% of the responses are
hidden. This suggests that targeting a small number of responses to
hide can be a very effective strategy to mitigate the negative effects
of social influence. The intervention achieves the highest success
when τ = 0.6, which corresponds to hiding around 35% to 65%
of the responses. The effects of coordination are not considered
in the model, but note that coordination would only have an effect
when at least some of the responses are not hidden. When τ = 0.6,
many responses are still visible, which would allow respondents
to coordinate and potentially increase the success of the poll even
more.
6. DISCUSSION
In this research, we sought to understand how social influence
takes place and how it relates to the success of event scheduling.To
do so, we examined more than 1.3 million polls generated by Doo-
dle users. Results from our analysis provide three overarching find-
ings:
1. Early poll respondents are most influential in determining the
success of polls. This suggests that respondents who come
later engage in information cascades that ultimately limit the
options for the following respondents. As a consequence, the
availability of early respondents is vital to the success of the
polls.
2. Respondents are influenced the most by their preceding neigh-
bor. The availability of those before the preceding respon-
dent still have some influence, but its impact diminishes rapidly.
This localized influence can give rise to cascading effects that
have a global impact on the poll.
3. Based on simulations of our event scheduling model, the
likelihood of finding a mutually agreeable time increases when
a small number of respondents with the lowest availability
are hidden.
We now discuss these findings and their implications.
6.1 Early Respondents are Most Influential
Our findings suggest that there is strong social influence in event
scheduling. This extends the work of Reinecke et al. [27], who
found that open polls are more likely to result in mutually agreeable
times than hidden polls and suggested that people must actively
change their availability in order to find mutually agreeable times.
We provide empirical evidence that information cascade effects are
part of the process with the availability of early respondents greatly
driving the success of polls.
If a respondent’s availability is subject to social influence, event
scheduling becomes a subjective choice process with people ac-
tively changing their availability to match or mismatch those of
others. This can have positive effects, such as when respondents
provide more availability than they actually have in order to find a
mutually agreeable time. It can also have negative effects on the
success of a poll, as our analysis showed, if early respondents in-
dicate a low availability and others follow. In either case, event
scheduling is no longer an objective choice-process that is based
on facts (i.e., "my calendar shows that I am free at this time"), and
its success is highly dependent on group dynamics and participants’
willingness to place the group’s goal above their personal interests.
Hence, if a poll initiator wants to ensure that poll participants pro-
vide their truthful availability, the use of calendar systems, such as
Microsoft Outlook or Google Calendar, that allow users to match
previously entered availabilities might be a better option – assum-
ing participants are willing to disclose this information (see also
[20] for a discussion on privacy in scheduling).
6.2 Choices are Most Influenced by the Pre-
ceding Neighbor
The results of our analysis showed that people craft their avail-
ability to match those of immediately preceding poll respondents.
A possible explanation for this is that the availability of a respon-
dent’s nearest preceding neighbor is perceived as an accurate de-
piction of the group’s overall availability. As such, basing their
availability on the information of the nearest preceding neighbor
minimizes their effort. Related to this, they may have noticed a
funneling effect where availability decreases with the least avail-
able options presented by the last respondent. The availability of
their nearest preceding neighbor would then be a good representa-
tion of the options that are likely going to be successful.
An alternative explanation is the recency effect, which suggests
that individuals tend to remember information presented at the end
of a list best [8]. If this is true, then the location of the nearest
neighbors might only heighten this effect; The information pre-
sented by the nearest preceding neighbor is more salient because
of its location to the incoming poll participant’s space provided to
them to list their availability. In other words, respondents assume
that their nearest preceding neighbor have taken into account the
availability of others. Therefore, they may believe that matching
with their nearest neighbor represents the best chance of achieving
a successful poll.
While crafting their availability to match others can lead to a
higher likelihood of poll success, we would want to discourage par-
ticipants from listing only a small number of available times since
this would decrease the number of participants who are accommo-
dated at the most popular time slot.
6.3 Hiding Low-Availability Respondents In-
creases Success
There are several ways of mitigating the negative effect of social
influence on the success of event scheduling. One possibility would
be a design intervention that makes low-availability respondents
aware of the negative influence of their choices in the hope that they
will alter their availability. While raising awareness might convince
some participants to edit their choices, such an intervention could
be perceived as questioning the truthfulness of their availability.
Another option would be to shuffle responses in order to alle-
viate the funneling effect in which availability decreases with the
number of poll respondents. Arriving poll participants may find it
more difficult to see a pattern of funneling when the availability of
respondents are presented randomly rather than sequentially. This,
in turn, may reduce the bias associated with the nearest neighbor.
While we believe that this could reduce people’s tendency to be in-
fluenced by the availability of their immediately preceding neigh-
bor, it is unlikely to solve the problem related to the disproportion-
ate influence of the first few poll participants.
A third, more promising possibility is to hide responses that
could potentially negatively influence proceeding poll participants.
In our simulations, we showed that the likelihood of finding a mutu-
ally agreeable time increases when a small number of respondents
with the lowest availability are hidden. The more respondents are
hidden, the higher the likelihood of poll success, up to a point. We
found that we can optimize poll success by hiding 35-50% of re-
spondents with the lowest availability. We note that it’s important
to consider the specific goals of each poll before deciding if hiding
low availability responses is likely to generate better results for the
group. For example, in some polls the attendance of only a subset
of individuals is required. In this case, it is possible that hiding the
availability of these individuals would not yield a better outcome.
Ultimately, the creator of the poll should be given the option of
hiding all responses (hidden polls), no responses (open polls), or a
subset of low availability of responses as we suggest in this paper.
The results of our simulation have implications for reducing so-
cial influence in other group-decision making processes. For ex-
ample, social influence effects have been identified as a problem
in online voting sites [25], with people often being biased by early
responses. The results of our model indicate that it is possible to
reduce this bias by hiding a given number of extreme responses.
Some social media sites that include a voting system already tem-
porarily hide the initial votes of content before users have con-
sumed the content to avoid cascades from occurring [25]. Our
findings suggests that this technique can be improved by hiding ex-
treme prior votes or responses from arriving individuals before they
cast their vote. Only once members have voted would the popular-
ity of responses become visible. This could allow individuals to see
a diversity of views while reducing the bias associated with social
influence.
7. LIMITATIONS
We made several assumptions in our analysis that need to be
taken into account when interpreting the results. First, our measure
of success may not match the goals of all Doodle users. We opera-
tionalized success as a percentage of participants who are available
on the most popular time slot. This assumes that Doodle users are
always trying to find a slot that accommodates as many people as
possible. However, in some cases, people may be attempting to find
a slot that accommodates all respondents. In this case, our measure
is a proxy for how close the poll was from being successful rather
than a quantification of how successful the poll was.
Second, we assume that respondents are independent of each
other. In doing so, we ignore the relationships between respon-
dents. However, these relationships may impact the way respon-
dents declare their availability. For example, some respondents
may exert high influence over other respondents’ schedules such
as the case when people are scheduling a meeting with their boss
or other people above them in a hierarchy. While previous research
has highlighted the role of social hierarchy in determining indi-
vidual availability [23], our data does not include information that
would allow us to consider such relationships.
Third, hidden polls might be used for different purposes than
open polls. To the degree that this is true, our comparison between
hidden and open polls may over-attribute their differences to be-
ing able to see the listed times of others. Our data does not in-
clude such differences between open and hidden polls for reasons
of anonymity, but a possible difference between hidden and open
polls should be investigated in the future.
Finally, we do not account for coordination or a group member’s
intention to meet in our model. Coordination reflects the degree to
which group members are able to organize and synchronize their
actions [29, 31]. Respondents may actively coordinate their sched-
ules in an attempt to find a time that best suits everyone. The effects
of coordination could explain why open polls are generally more
successful than hidden polls. We also did not include members’
intention to make time available to meet. Intentions can reflect the
degree to which someone is motivated to participate in the meet-
ing[34]. It is possible that some respondents intentionally sought
to undermine the scheduling process in order to avoid meeting. In
the future, we plan to extend our current model to take this into
account.
Ultimately, experiments and real interventions are necessary to
establish the presence of social influence in scheduling and the ef-
fectiveness of the interventions. However, our results provide ini-
tial evidence that cascades occur in scheduling and suggest possible
interventions that have the potential of making scheduling services
more efficient.
8. CONCLUSION
This work provides evidence of information cascade effects in
online event scheduling, showing that the success of a poll depends
on the availability of early respondents and that participants are
particularly influenced by the availability of their directly preceding
neighbor. In many cases, this can mitigate the success of a poll (i.e.,
finding a mutually agreeable time). We therefore proposed a set of
interventions that can help alleviate this bias and show that we can
optimize the chances to find a mutually agreeable time. We hope
that our findings help inform the design of future event scheduling
systems and enable groups to more effectively arrange a time to
meet.
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